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OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF LEGAL RECOURSE: 
INTERPRETING AND REVISING TITLE VII TO PROHIBIT 
WORKPLACE SEGREGATION BASED ON RELIGION 
DAWINDER S. SIDHU 
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, ABC News aired an investigative hidden-camera segment in which 
three job applicants—a Jewish man with a yarmulke, a Muslim woman with a hijab, and 
a Sikh man with a turban—were denied employment at a restaurant. The employer and 
the applicants were played by actors. In front of and within earshot of real-life customers, 
the employer rejected the applicants because their religious attire did not conform to the 
employer’s dress code policy.1 For example, the restaurant manager informed the Sikh 
applicant that he would not hire him “looking the way you look.”2 According to the 
employer, his turban could be “threatening to anyone sitting here eating.”3  
The purpose of the segment was to ascertain how unsuspecting members of the 
public would respond to blatant discrimination based on religious appearance. Some 
patrons objected to the restaurant manager for acting in a discriminatory, unfair fashion.4 
One African-American patron likened the employer’s treatment of the Sikh applicant to 
discrimination on the basis of race. The patron wondered if the manager could “say it to 
me about my color or my religious beliefs. It’s the same thing, right?”5 Another troubled 
witness admonished the manager, “I’m just not sure you’re aware of how illegal it 
is….You’re lucky there are no other lawyers around.”6 
As it turns out, the restaurant patrons’ assumption that courts would find such 
conduct illegal is mistaken. For years, federal courts have enabled employers to engage in 
the behavior depicted in this broadcast. Where there is a conflict between an employee’s 
appearance based on his or her religion and an employer’s interest in avoiding negative 
customer reaction, federal courts allow employers to resolve this conflict by placing the 
religious employee in a position out of public view or by refusing to hire him or her 
altogether. According to the courts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
∗ J.D., The George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of 
Pennsylvania.  Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. 
1 See What Would You Do? (ABC News television broadcast May 6, 2011), available at 
http://abc.go.com/watch/what-would-you-do/SH5555951/VD55125732/what-would-you-do-56. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 In the case of the woman wearing a hijab, the patrons interviewed in the program exclusively expressed 
support for her against the potential employer. However, patrons expressed mixed support for the two male 
applicants. Some argued that the men should have to remove their religious attire if the employer had a 
conflicting dress code policy, or that they should “fit in” with America, which ostensibly means such 
religious attire is not acceptable or appropriate. See id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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VII”)7—which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of several protected 
categories, including religion8—protects all aspects of religious observance and practice 
unless an employer cannot “reasonably accommodate” the practice or observance without 
“undue hardship.”9 Courts have ruled that it is a “reasonable accommodation” of the 
employee’s religion to segregate an employee with religious attire—by, for example, 
placing him or her in the back room.10 Courts have also held that hiring such an 
employee may result in economic costs that amount to an “undue hardship.”11 
The purpose of this article is to argue that the federal courts’ prevailing 
interpretation of Title VII with respect to religious attire in the workplace is inconsistent 
with the law. I maintain that Title VII prohibits employers from either placing employees 
in the back or refusing to hire individuals with conspicuous articles of faith due to any 
actual or perceived social discomfort with the employee’s religion-based appearance.12 I 
am persuaded of this for two independent reasons. First, placing an employee out of 
public view does not constitute a “reasonable accommodation” under Title VII because 
the statute’s general anti-discrimination provision expressly prohibits employers from 
“segregating” employees.13 There is no basis for suspecting that this clear, broad negative 
on employer conduct does not extend to employees whose appearance is dictated by their 
religious beliefs.14 To cure the defect in its approach, I encourage a court sitting in review 
of a religion-based segregation case to analyze an employer’s proffered “reasonable 
accommodation” in light of this general anti-discrimination provision. In doing so, the 
religious rights of employees would be maximized in accordance with their statutory 
limits. Second, an employer may not base its decision to segregate an individual with a 
religiously-mandated appearance on customers’ possible or demonstrated discriminatory 
preferences.15 Where courts enable employers to rely on such actual or perceived biases, 
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (2006). 
8 See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer” to “fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s. . . religion”). 
9 Id. § 2000e(j). 
10 For a representative example, see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Birdi v. United Airlines Corp., No. 99 C 
5576, 2002 WL 471999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002).  
11 For a representative example, see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. 
Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
12 This article is interested in employer decisions based on concerns about customer responses to 
conspicuous articles of faith or a desire to maintain a certain public image. Accordingly, this article does 
not challenge employer decisions that are based on legitimate, non-religion-based considerations such as 
employee health or safety. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383–84 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that a Sikh employee with a beard would be exposed to toxic gas since his respirator would not be 
able to create a gas-tight seal, therefore, an exemption from the employer’s shaving policy would represent 
an undue hardship). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer…(2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) 
14 See infra Part III.A. 
15 See infra Part III.B. 
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they allow employers to give practical effect to those biases. By prohibiting customer 
bias from supporting the segregation described, courts would also clarify that religion-
based appearance discrimination is on par with and deserves the same treatment as racial 
discrimination; in the civil rights era, courts did not permit customer bias to justify 
discrimination against African-Americans. While employers may contend that their 
practices reflect non-discriminatory corporate identities rather than customer stereotypes, 
in my estimation this sleight-of-hand falls flat—a corporate “brand” simply codifies and 
reflects consumer preferences, including stereotypes.16  
This article does more than offer a legal argument for why federal courts must 
modify their existing interpretation of Title VII.17 As federal courts have consistently 
read Title VII to permit such segregation despite the text and purpose of the statute—as 
well as applicable lessons from the nation’s painful experience with racial 
discrimination—I also write in support of the pending Workplace Religious Freedom Act 
(WFRA) of 2010.18 In part, this bill would prevent employers from using Title VII to 
justify an “out of sight, out of mind” model by amending the statute to explicitly prohibit 
the “segregation of an employee from customers or the general public.”19 This language 
in effect would ban employers from catering to public image concerns by removing 
individuals with religious attire from public view.  
The term “segregation” is most commonly used in the context of race, and 
accordingly, triggers strong, visceral feelings. I acknowledge and appreciate these 
emotions, and recognize that some readers may object to the use of the term 
“segregation” beyond the boundaries of race. With due consideration to this instinctive 
reaction, I believe “segregation” may be used judiciously and appropriately whenever 
individuals are separated from others solely because of some identifiable characteristic. 
The use of the term “segregation” in this article does not intend to minimize its meaning 
in the context of race, but attempts to establish a bridge between our nation’s history of 
racial intolerance and a modern iteration of segregation.  
By placing employees with conspicuous religious appearances out of public view, 
or by not hiring such applicants, employers engage in a practice of segregation. This 
segregation takes two forms. Both lead to the physical separation and isolation that are 
the touchstones of the term. First, when an employer  places an employee with religious 
attire in the “back,” out of public view, it designates a distinct physical space that an 
employee is restricted to only because of his or her religious appearance, and necessarily 
a separate area where employees without this appearance are free to associate and 
congregate. Second, when individuals are denied positions on account of their religious 
16 Id. 
17 The two independent reasons cited above are internal to Title VII. That is, I argue that Title VII on its 
own terms does not justify the segregation of individuals with conspicuous religious attire. For a 
recommendation that Title VII should import the heightened “undue hardship” standard from the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, see Sadia Aslam, Note, Hijab in the Workplace: Why Title VII Does not 
Adequately Protect Employees from Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Dress and Appearance, 80 
UMKC L. REV. 221, 236 (2011). 
18 S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010). 
19 See id. § (4)(a)(3). 
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appearance, they are left outside of the workforce and removed from the spheres of 
human intercourse that are inherent in employment. In short, as used here, segregation is 
both within the workplace and from the workplace.  
To prove why Title VII should not permit such religion-based segregation, Part II 
of this article provides an overview of Title VII’s legal standards as they relate to 
discrimination on the basis of religion. In addition, I describe, for illustrative purposes, 
two decisions in which the federal courts held that Title VII does not prohibit the 
segregation of Sikh employees who wear turbans. Part III argues that such segregation is 
not permitted by Title VII, based on the text and purpose of Title VII, the effect of 
segregation in promoting majoritarian norms and perpetuating harmful stereotypes, and 
principles from other historical and civil rights contexts. Part IV discusses the 
implications of this argument by addressing its relationship to the Supreme Court’s 
religious discrimination decisions in the constitutional context as well as the function of 
the courts in checking employer behavior.  
Before proceeding further, it is important to set forth why this inquiry into 
appearance-based treatment of religious individuals is necessary. First, employment 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of appearance is pervasive. A 2005 survey 
by the Employment Law Alliance found that 16 percent of workers believed they had 
been subject to appearance-related discrimination.”20 This figure is comparable to the 
percentage of individuals who identify as victims of sex-based discrimination or racial 
discrimination.21 Recent cases also exemplify the prevalence of appearance-based 
discrimination. In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, recently decided by the Supreme Court,22 a former 
female Walmart employee alleged that she was told by a manager to “blow the cobwebs 
off” her make-up and “doll up” in order to advance in the company.23  
Second, if Title VII does not reject segregation of the sort addressed in this article, 
it calls into question the promise and effectiveness of a statute designed to safeguard 
employees from discrimination on the basis of religion.  
Third, workplace segregation is not solely a provincial concern. It is not 
exclusively committed by small “Mom and Pop” employers or companies in rural 
settings. Large, national corporations—such as Subway, Alamo Rent-a-Car, and Jiffy 
Lube, among others—have allegedly engaged in workplace segregation on the basis of 
religion.24 For example, a Sikh musician with a beard, long hair, and turban alleged that 
20 Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1060 (2009). 
21 Id. at 1060–61. 
22 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The issue before the Court was not whether the 
employer was liable for discrimination on the merits, but rather whether the plaintiffs were sufficiently 
common such that class action certification is appropriate. The Court held that such certification was not 
consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class action claims. See id. 
23 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at ¶ 65, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 
2004), 2002 WL 33645690. 
24 See Ali v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 8 F. App’x 156 (4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 
2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006); Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006); see also 
Subway Restaurant Owner Told Wearing Turban Violates Subway Policy, SIKH COALITION, Apr. 2005, 
available at http://www.sikhcoalition.org/advisories/sldf0405.htm (profiling the matter of a Sikh Subway 
franchisee who was told by a corporate inspector “that he would have to start wearing a Subway cap 
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he was rejected for a position at Walt Disney World for not possessing the “Disney 
look.”25 Disney described the necessary look as “a fresh, clean and approachable look, 
ensuring that every guest feels comfortable with our entire cast.”26 If many large 
companies engage in such segregation, it is reasonable to believe that the universe of 
individuals potentially subject to workplace segregation is quite large. 
 Fourth, one can imagine that appearance-based discrimination would be roundly 
condemned if the individuals were segregated due to their race, gender, or ethnicity.27 
Discrimination against individuals with prescribed religious appearances should meet 
with the same reaction and receive the same protection. The United States is a nation 
built on the notion of religious freedom.28 The outward representation of an individual’s 
religious beliefs is in effect religion made tangible or observable. Protecting employers 
who discriminate on the basis of an individual’s religious appearance signals the 
weakening of religious liberty, an otherwise first-order object of American law and 
society.  
 Finally, and most broadly, society’s acceptance or abhorrence of workplace 
segregation defines the type of community in which we live. It asks us to determine 
                                                                                                                                                 
instead of his turban and reported to local headquarters that Harbans was in violation of company policy 
because he was wearing a turban.”); Marina Jimenez, Second manager complains of discrimination: 
Subway Restaurants faces criticism over prohibition against turban-wearing, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 
26, 2003, A18 (“Another manager of a Subway Restaurants franchise in Edmonton has come forward with 
a complaint of religious discrimination, alleging an official of the sandwich chain refused to let him wear 
his turban while serving customers.”). 
25 See scottpowers, Sikh Musician Sues Disney World Over “Disney Look,” Discrimination, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (June 16, 2008, 11:05 AM), 
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/business_tourism_aviation/2008/06/sikh-musician-s.html (explaining that 
while the applicant believes he was rejected because of his appearance, Disney maintains that the applicant 
was rejected because he did not reapply for the position). 
26 Janna Oberdorf, The Secret Behind the Magic of Disney, NYULIVEWIRE, 
http://journalism.nyu.edu/publishing/archives/livewire/archived/the_secret_behind_the_magic_of (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2011). 
27 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). See also my discussion of the case, infra 
note [xxx] and accompanying notes. To be sure, alleged appearance-based discrimination has been upheld 
where courts construe the element of appearance at issue (e.g., a hairstyle) as a personal preference and not 
an immutable extension or manifestation of racial identity. See Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-
CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 at *6 (M.D.Ga. 2008); Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(rejecting the Title VII claim, but stating that, “[i]t is not impossible to imagine a situation in which a 
frivolous appearance guideline so disparately impacts a protected class that a jury could infer from the 
existence of that situation alone that the employer adopted the guideline as a ‘subterfuge for 
discrimination’”). I suggest, however, that mandated religious appearance is akin to an immutable trait, 
such as race itself, and thus should be similarly viewed and treated as racial segregation. 
28 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that no 
liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees than 
is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”); Abington Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (“The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, 
achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the . . . inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. 
We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of the government to 
invade that citadel. . . .”).   
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whether social space should be reserved exclusively for members of majority groups or 
whether we should include individuals of all backgrounds and beliefs. Unless the Court 
or Congress alters the current interpretation of Title VII, employers may continue to 
reinforce and perpetuate the notion that individuals who look “different” because of their 
religion—particularly those belonging to minority faiths—may permissibly be relegated 
to the “back rooms” or margins of American society. This article suggests that Title VII, 
properly interpreted, does not permit such social separation. 
 
II. TITLE VII AND WORKPLACE SEGREGATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CONSPICUOUS 
RELIGIOUS ATTIRE 
A. The Applicable Legal Standards 
1. The Statutory Framework: Title VII 
 Title VII is the federal statute governing discrimination in the employment 
context.29 The statute prohibits certain conduct and imposes affirmative duties on 
employers. The statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such 
individual’s . . . religion,”30 or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion.”31 The term “religion” is quite 
broad, and encompasses “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as 
belief. . .”32 Title VII affirmatively obligates an employer to “reasonably accommodate” 
an individual’s religious observance and practice.33 But an employer need not offer a 
reasonable accommodation if doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on the 
employer.34 
 The Supreme Court has recognized two primary theories of liability under Title 
VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. A disparate treatment claim is based on the 
proposition that the employer has “treat[ed] some people less favorably than others 
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”35 Plaintiffs in disparate 
treatment cases must prove that the defendant employer “had a discriminatory intent or 
motive.”36 By contrast, a disparate impact claim challenges “employment practices that 
                                                 
29 Title VII applies only to employers with at least fifteen employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) 
(“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees. . . .”). Title VII does not apply to certain educational institutions that are affiliated with 
religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). Non-citizens employed abroad are also ineligible for Title 
VII protection. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
31 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(2). 
32 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j).  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
36 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988). See also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) 
6  
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly 
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”37 To prove a 
disparate impact claim, a plaintiff need not present “evidence of the employer’s 
subjective intent to discriminate[, which] is required in a ‘disparate treatment’ case.”38 
 Workplace segregation cases are characterized by a conflict between the 
appearance of the employee or applicant, which is dictated by his or her religious beliefs, 
and the employer’s policies or corporate image standards, which are designed to make the 
employer attractive or otherwise acceptable to the public. Examples of such corporate 
policies include grooming requirements that prohibit beards or long hair. or rules banning 
employees from wearing hats. An individual whose religious appearance violates an 
employer’s policies often seeks, and is generally entitled to, an accommodation on 
account of his or her religious beliefs. But these “religious accommodation” cases do not 
conform to the disparate treatment and disparate impact categories described above.39 
They are subject to a distinct, judicially-created form of analysis.  
 
2. The Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 
 Courts in religious accommodation cases first require a plaintiff to present a prima 
facie case, which necessitates a showing that the plaintiff has: (1) a bona fide religious 
belief that conflicts with the employer’s applicable policies or rules, (2) informed the 
employer of this belief, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action for failing to 
comply with the conflicting employer policy or rule.40 An adverse employment action is 
broadly interpreted as any “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits.”41 An employee does not need to show 
                                                 
37 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating 
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation”). 
38 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 646 (1989). For further analysis of the distinction 
between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, see Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 579, 599–600 (2001) (“The major conceptual distinction between the two theories is that 
disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent or motivation, while disparate impact reaches 
unintentional discrimination that stems from neutral policies or practices that have a disproportionate 
adverse effect. . . .”). 
39 See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 317 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Where the issue is the 
incompatibility of a religious practice with a job requirement, religious discrimination claims do not fit 
comfortably into the ordinary Title VII dichotomy between ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘disparate impact’ 
theories of liability.”). 
40 Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. 
R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)).  
41 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Such an action “might be indicated by a 
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished 
title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that 
might be unique to a particular situation.” Id. (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 
F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993). However, a “demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige” 
or a “reassignment to [a] more inconvenient job” does not constitute an adverse employment action. Id. 
(citations omitted). 
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he or she was subjected to an adverse employment action if the employee can prove that 
he or she acceded to the employment policy under a reasonable fear of being subjected to 
an adverse employment action.42 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, “[A]lthough we have 
occasionally used language implying that the employer must discharge the employee 
because of the conflict, we have never in fact required that the employee’s penalty for 
observing his or her faith be so drastic.”43 
 Though the elements of a prima facie case are rarely litigated in religion-based 
appearance discrimination cases,44 some plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie 
showing. In Hussein v. Waldorf Astoria Hotel, for example, a Muslim catering employee 
challenged the Waldorf-Astoria hotel’s “no-beards” policy.45 The Second Circuit held, 
however, that the employee, who one day came to work with a beard, lacked a bona fide 
religious belief, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case.46 According to the court, 
the plaintiff “had never before, in his fourteen years of working at the Waldorf, worn a 
beard” and “he did not attempt to explain why this was so.”47 Further undercutting the 
plaintiff’s case, he “shaved the beard off three months later.”48 Therefore, “a reasonable 
jury could not find that Hussein’s religious assertion was bona fide.”49 In Ali v. Alamo 
Rent-A-Car Inc., the Fourth Circuit decided that a Muslim employee failed to establish a 
prima facie case because she did not prove an adverse employment action.50 Alamo had 
transferred the employee to a position with less customer contact because she wore a 
headscarf. The plaintiff conceded that the transfer did not constitute an “adverse 
employment action.”51 Therefore, the court held the employee failed to make out a prima 
facie case.52  
A separate case invites the view that the decision may have been different had the 
plaintiff not conceded that she did not suffer an adverse employment action. In Brown v. 
F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts explained that the determination of whether an employment action is 
                                                 
42 See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The threat of 
discharge (or of other adverse employment practices) is a sufficient penalty. An employee does not cease to 
be discriminated against because he temporarily gives up his religious practice and submits to the 
employment policy.”). See also Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 95-CV-5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996) (“It is nonsensical to suggest that an employee who, when forced by his employer 
to choose between his job and his faith, elects to avoid potential financial and/or professional damage by 
acceding to his employer’s religiously objectionable demands has not been the victim of religious 
discrimination.”). 
43 See Townley, 859 F.2d at 614 n.5 (emphasis in original). 
44 See Blair, supra note 20, at 539 (noting that employees generally survive the prima facie step without 
difficulty and that it is the next step in which the heart of the legal dispute generally lies). 
45 Hussein v. Waldorf Astoria Hotel, 31 Fed.Appx. 740, 741 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2002). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 8 Fed. App’x 156, 157 (4th Cir. 2001). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 159. 
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adverse is case-specific.53 In assessing whether the responsibilities the plaintiff lost were 
significant enough to constitute an adverse employment action, the court reasoned that “it 
would be distasteful to suggest that employers can legally single out employees who 
assert inconvenient but bonafide religious beliefs and isolate them in unappealing work 
environments without ‘adversely’ affecting the conditions of their employment.”54 At the 
summary judgment stage, the court held that the employee’s transfer could constitute an 
adverse employment action because a jury could find that “the responsibilities Plaintiff 
lost [in the transfer] were ‘significant’” and not “merely ‘minor changes.’”55 Despite this, 
the court ultimately held that the plaintiff sought too much and that approving the 
requested “blanket exemption from the grooming policy . . . would constitute an undue 
hardship”; therefore, the court found for the defendant at the summary judgment phase.56 
 
3. The “Reasonable Accommodation”and “Undue Hardship” Tests 
 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant-
employer57 to show either that: (1) a reasonable accommodation was offered by the 
plaintiff (that is, that the employer’s affirmative duty under Title VII was satisfied), or (2) 
an undue hardship would result if a reasonable accommodation were made (that is, that 
the statutory safe haven should shield the employer from liability).58  
 In the religious discrimination context, the Supreme Court holds that a 
“reasonable accommodation” is one that “eliminates the conflict between employment 
requirements and religious practices.”59 An acceptable “reasonable accommodation” 
must be the by-product of a good faith back-and-forth between the employer and the 
employee.60 Speaking to this requirement, the United States District Court for the 
                                                 
53 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D. Mass. 2006).  
54 Id. at 13–14. See id. at 15 (ruling that plaintiff met prima facie case of discrimination where 
“Defendant’s accommodation restricted Plaintiff to a cold, uncomfortable, isolated work site, with 
significantly diminished responsibilities, as the price of maintaining his bonafide religious practice”).  
55 Id. at 13. 
56 Id. at 17. 
57 The burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times; however, the defendant possesses the 
burden of production in this shifting scheme. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 
(1989). 
58 See Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A plaintiff alleging 
religious discrimination under Title VII must first establish a prima facie case, after which the burden is on 
the employer to show that a reasonable accommodation of the religious practice was made or that any 
accommodation would result in undue hardship.”).See also Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 
63, 74 (1997)  (a reasonable accommodation is not required if it poses an “undue hardship”). 
59 Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). In this sense, the term “reasonable” may be 
misleading, as an accommodation need only fulfill the objective of removing the conflict to be deemed 
“reasonable.” 
60 See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 (stating that “bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an 
acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s 
business”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although I argue that relegating an employee to 
the back is never a reasonable result of this back-and-forth negotiation, when an individual employee 
requests to be placed in the back, I would not consider the accommodation to be unreasonable under Title 
VII. See Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SA-05-CA-0319 OG (NN), 2006 WL 1562235, at *10 (W.D. 
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Southern District of New York held in Hussein that an employer is not required to 
accommodate an immediate, “on-the-spot” request by a religious employee who wants an 
exception to an appearance policy.61 The nature of Hussein’s last-minute request did not 
present an opportunity for the employer and employee to engage in a collaborative 
dialogue as to an appropriate accommodation. The United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona rejected an employer’s proposed accommodation based, in part, on 
the same requirement. The accommodation proposed by the employer—that an employee 
remove a religious headscarf when working with clients—did not resolve the tension 
because it was not developed from a good faith, bilateral process.62  
 While an accommodation should result from employer-employee dialogue, an 
employee is not entitled to a range of possible accommodations from which to select.63 
Nor is an employee entitled to an optimal accommodation or to the accommodation he or 
she suggests or wants. As the Second Circuit notes, “to avoid Title VII liability, the 
employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any 
reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends.”64  
It is worth noting that this iterative process can yield satisfactory outcomes for 
both the employer and the employee. For example, in EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 
through this process, the employer agreed to a religion-based exemption to its policy 
requiring all employees engaged in customer contact to be clean-shaven.65 
 Rather than offer an accommodation, an employer may contend that an 
accommodation would result in an “undue hardship.” An “undue hardship” is any 
economic or non-economic cost that imposes more than a de minimis encumbrance on the 
employer.66 For example, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court 
held that an airline was not required to allow a religious employee to miss work on the 
Sabbath because granting the employee’s schedule request would disrupt the seniority 
system and finding other employees to take his place would result in “lost efficiency in 
other jobs or higher wages.”67 From Hardison, it is evident that an employer may show 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tex. May 24, 2006) (employee who wore a priest’s shirt and collar, and other religious attire, proposed that 
Walmart “allow him to work his entire shift in the backroom of the store thereby removing him from the 
customers’ view”).  
61 See Hussein v. The Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
62 EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013–14 (D. Ariz. 2006).   
63 See Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[C]ompliance with 
Title VII does not require an employer to give an employee a choice among several accommodations. . . .”). 
64 Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2nd Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). See also Philbrook, 479 U.S. 
at 68 (“We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose 
any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable 
accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.”); Beadle, 29 F.3d at 
592 (stating that “the inquiry ends when an employer shows that a reasonable accommodation was afforded 
the employee, regardless of whether that accommodation is one which the employee suggested”).  
65 EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV100-50 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2001) (consent decree) (in case brought 
by a Muslim employee, the employer agreed to a religion-based exemption to a policy requiring that 
employees engaged in customer contact had to be clean-shaven). 
66 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (8th Cir. 1997) (“To require TWA to bear 
more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”). 
67 Id. 
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that it faces an undue hardship when a proposed accommodation imposes on other 
employees as well as when it burdens the employer itself.68  
 In the religious appearance context, courts have identified an undue hardship 
under several circumstances. An undue hardship may be present when an employee 
demands a wholesale exception from the employer’s appearance policies, and is 
unwilling to find a compromise solution.69 For example, in Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., the plaintiff, a follower of the Church of Body Modification, refused to cover her 
facial piercings with bandages, and insisted instead on an outright exemption to the no-
piercings policy.70 The First Circuit held that such exemption constituted an undue 
hardship because piercings “detract from the ‘neat, clean and professional image’ that 
[Costco] aims to cultivate.”71 Similarly, in Daniels v. City of Arlington, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the defendant employer faced an undue hardship when the plaintiff police 
officer insisted on wearing a gold cross pin on his uniform, in violation of the police 
department’s no-pins policy. According to the court, the  police department faced an 
undue hardship because  “a police department cannot be forced to let individual officers 
add religious symbols to their official uniforms.”72 
 An undue hardship also may exist when a compromise is “simply impossible”: 
“[f]or example, there is no middle ground between a company’s requirements that 
employees be clean-shaven and the employees’ religious beliefs prohibiting shaving.”73 
Courts have also recognized an undue hardship where exemptions would affect the 
employer’s public image.74 Undue hardship is perhaps most clearly present where an 
accommodation would endanger the health or safety of the employee, his or her co-
workers, or the general public.75 For example, in Kalsi v. New York City Transit 
                                                 
68 See Weber v. Roadway Express Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the proposed 
accommodation was “more than a de minimis expense because [it] unduly burden[ed] his co-workers, with 
respect to compensation and ‘time-off’ concerns”). 
69 See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 2004) (“We find dispositive 
that the only accommodation Cloutier considers reasonable, a blanket exemption from the no-facial-jewelry 
policy, would impose an undue hardship on Costco.”) Cf. Dodd v. SEPTA, No. 06-4213, 2008 WL 
2902618, at *10 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2008) (rejecting, on summary judgment, defendant’s argument that it 
suffered an undue hardship when the plaintiff “merely requested to wear his hair in any style that would 
allow him to keep it long, a minor deviation from the grooming policy that apparently was already 
practiced by several other officers”).  
70 Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 128–30. 
71 Id. at 136. 
72 Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2001). By eschewing other options, such as 
wearing the cross around his neck or wrist, the plaintiff also failed to “fulfill his duty of cooperation” under 
the reasonable accommodation prong. Id. 
73 United States v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 04-CV-4237, 2010 WL 3855191, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 28, 2010) (citing Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
74 See, e.g., Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that allowing the 
plaintiff to keep his hair and beard long, in violation of Jiffy Lube’s grooming policy, would constitute “an 
undue hardship because it would adversely affect the employer’s public image.”) (quoting Cloutier v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005)). 
75 See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding an undue hardship where Sikh 
plainitff’s failure to shave his beard would expose him to toxic gas ). If “the proposed accommodation 
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Authority, a Sikh employee sought an accommodation to the Transit Authority’s 
requirement that all car inspectors wear a hard hat. The court, unsurprisingly, was 
unsympathetic. The court concluded that Kalsi’s proposed request to not wear a hard hat 
posed safety risks to himself as well as insurance costs to the authority that the employer 
was not obligated under Title VII to shoulder.76 
 To be sure, under this category of undue hardship, courts have rejected employer 
attempts to invoke the undue hardship safe harbor where a proposed accommodation 
would not raise “safety concerns or other legitimate business concerns.”77 In United 
States v. New York City Transit Authority, for example, a group of Sikh employees 
brought a religious appearance claim against the transit authority for failing to allow an 
exemption from its policy requiring bus drivers to wear hats bearing the company’s 
logo.78 The court held that the employees’ proposed compromise—that they wear a 
turban of a color that reflects the employer’s uniform and place the company logo on a 
different part of their uniform other than the turban—would not “adversely affect the 
TA’s business in any way.”79 Courts have also been unreceptive to employers’ attempts 
to demonstrate an undue hardship by claiming that a flood of similar requests for 
accommodations will follow if the court grants the exception. “A mere assumption that 
many more people, with the same religious practices as the person being accommodated, 
may also need accommodation is not evidence of undue hardship.”80  
 The bulk of litigation with respect to religious accommodation cases—of which 
workplace segregation cases are a subset—lies in this second part of the burden-shifting 
scheme: whether an employer has discharged its duty to offer a reasonable 
accommodation or whether an undue hardship justifies the employer in refusing an 
accommodation.81 If an employer fulfills either prong and rebuts the employee’s prima 
facie case, the burden then shifts back to “the plaintiff, who has the ultimate burden of 
persuasion, [to] show that the employer’s proffered reasons for failure to accommodate 
                                                                                                                                                 
threatens to compromise safety in the workplace, the employer’s burden of establishing an undue burden is 
light.” Kalsi v. New York City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). However, at least 
one court has questioned whether the employer possessed a legitimate health and safety justification for 
refusing an accommodation, or whether the lack of an accommodation was a function of animus. See 
Mohamed-Sheik, 2006 WL 709573, at *5 (finding evidence that “safety concerns may not have been the 
exclusive, or even the primary factor behind the enforcement of the policy”).  
76 Kalsi, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 758–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
77 U.S. v. New York City Transit Auth., 2010 WL 3855191, at *21. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at *22. 
80 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2010). See also EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C04-
1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005) (“The court is unmoved by Red Robin’s 
final, ‘slippery slope’ argument . . . . Determining whether an undue hardship exists depends on the facts of 
each case, and ‘the mere possibility that there would be a unfulfillable number of additional requests for 
similar accommodations by others cannot constitute undue hardship.”) (quoting Opuku-Boateng v. 
California, 95 F.3d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
81 Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection 
Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 368 (2005) (stating that “when claims are brought on 
religious discrimination grounds, most of the litigation is centered on the issues of what is a ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ and what constitutes ‘undue hardship’”). 
12  
are a pretext for discrimination.”82 The plaintiff may establish pretext by demonstrating 
“directly . . . that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or 
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence.”83 
 
4. The “Bona Fide Occupational Qualification” Affirmative Defense 
 Title VII also provides employers with an affirmative defense to claims of 
discrimination. Instead of proceeding down the “reasonable accommodation” or “undue 
hardship” route, an employer may concede that it is discriminating on the basis of 
religion, but argue that such discrimination is permissible because it is based on a “bona 
fide occupational qualification [‘BFOQ’] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise.”84 To properly invoke the BFOQ affirmative 
defense, an employer must prove that virtually all members of the plaintiff’s class cannot 
perform the position in question85 or that the employer’s essential operations would be 
compromised were it not for the discrimination.86 
 An employer seeking to deny employment to a job applicant with conspicuous 
religious attire may, in principle, invoke the BFOQ affirmative defense. The BFOQ 
defense is “written narrowly” and the Supreme Court “has read it narrowly.”87 Indeed, it 
has been accepted only in several limited contexts.88 For example, courts have 
recognized the defense when discriminatory hiring is necessary to protect the privacy 
interests of third parties, such as when a health care employer hires only female nurses to 
treat female patients, or when a restaurant hires only male attendants to service a men’s 
bathroom.89 Courts have also recognized a valid BFOQ defense when the employment 
                                                 
82 Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1986). 
83 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). For an example of the court finding 
pretext, see Mohamed-Sheik v. Golden Foods/Golden Brands LLC, No. Civ.A. 303CV737H, 2006 WL 
709573, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2006) (denying defendant’s summary judgment motion after finding 
evidence that “safety concerns may not have been the exclusive, or even the primary factor behind the 
enforcement of the policy”). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). This affirmative defense is not available in claims alleging 
discrimination on the basis of race. See id. 
85 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
86 See id. (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)).. 
87 Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).  
88 See Ray v. Univ. of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104, 1126 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“in certain limited circumstances, 
courts are to recognize the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) defense”); see also U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Compliance Manual § 12II-D (2008) (Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html (“It is well settled that for employers that are 
not religious organizations and therefore seek to rely on the BFOQ defense to justify a religious preference, 
the defense is a narrow one and can rarely be successfully invoked.”). 
89 See Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 206 n.4 (suggesting that the BFOQ defense could be available “when privacy 
interests are implicated”); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(holding that using only female attendants in female restrooms is permissible when “a customer’s 
fundamental privacy rights are implicated”); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 
(D. Del. 1978) (holding that “employment of a male nurse’s aide would directly undermine the essence of 
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decision was purportedly made for safety reasons, such as when a prison hires only male 
guards to oversee the male section of a prison.90 With respect to gender discrimination, 
employers may engage in discriminatory employment practices when “authenticity” or 
“genuineness” is at stake, such as when a theatre company refuses to hire a man to play a 
female role in a play.91 In each of these circumstances, courts tolerated discrimination 
because it was based on a qualification that affected an “individual’s ability to perform 
the assigned tasks.”92 
B. Representative Cases of Workplace Segregation 
1. Workplace Segregation and Sikhs 
 Multiple courts have found in favor of employers in religious accommodation 
cases brought by individuals alleging discrimination on the basis of their appearance. 
That said, two cases best exemplify courts’ willingness to interpret Title VII to allow 
workplace segregation in the religious context. The courts in these cases address both 
aspects of the second, more contentious prong of the burden-shifting paradigm: whether 
the employer fulfilled its duty to offer a reasonable accommodation and whether the 
employer is relieved from having to offer a reasonable accommodation because doing so 
would impose an undue hardship. These cases also involve the two types of segregation 
referenced herein: segregation within the workplace (i.e., placing the employee out of 
public view once hired) and from the workplace (i.e., not hiring the candidate at all).  
 Because both cases involve plaintiffs who belong to the Sikh religion, it is 
relevant to first consider the inherent features of the Sikh religion that expose its 
followers to workplace segregation. Male Sikhs are required by their faith to wear a 
turban and to refrain from cutting their hair.93 These requirements give Sikhs a distinct, 
non-traditional physical identity that directly conflicts with common employer policies, 
such as those that mandate employees be clean-shaven or that prohibit headgear of any 
sort in the workplace. When working for an employer with such policies, Sikhs are often 
forced to choose between complying with their faith and abiding by their employer’s 
policies. A Sikh employee who decides to comply with the strictures of the Sikh religion 
may be relegated to a position outside of public view or be denied the job opportunity 
from the outset. 
 It is next helpful to consider the practical realities of the Sikh experience in the 
United States. Sikhs are more likely to face discrimination, including workplace 
discrimination, because they are a relatively little-known religious community often 
                                                                                                                                                 
[defendant’s] business operation” because female clients objected to seeing male nurses, and defendant was 
too small to hire enough aides so that at least one female nurse was on each shift).  
90 Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 202 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)). 
91 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2010). 
92 Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 203. 
93 See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995) (enumerating the Sikh articles of faith); 
Neha Singh Gohil & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Sikh Turban: Post-9/11 Challenges to this Article of Faith, 9 
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 10, 12 (2008) (explaining that Sikhs are required to wear five articles of faith, 
including unshorn hair, and that although the turban is not one of the five articles, it has been codified as 
part of a Sikh’s required dress). 
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mistaken for Muslims.94 While Sikhism is the fifth largest religion in the world, with 
over 20 million adherents,95 few are aware that Sikhism is a separate faith and as a 
consequence many Americans assume for purely optic reasons that Sikhs are members of 
the Muslim faith.96 Due to this visual similarity and the highly charged atmosphere in the 
wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Sikhs have faced overwhelming 
discrimination in the past ten years.97 
Because of this general public ignorance and because Sikhs remain a disfavored 
group, employers appear poised to cater to customer biases by placing Sikhs away from 
public view or by failing to hire Sikhs in the first instance. An example may help animate 
and give meaning to these observations.  
 Kevin Harrington is a Sikh train operator for the Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(MTA) in New York City. After 9/11, imagining that the public would not want to see a 
turbaned man at the helm of a commuter train in Manhattan, the MTA told Harrington 
that he could not wear his turban as a train operator. The MTA informed him that, if he 
wanted to wear his turban, he had to stop working as a rail conductor and accept a 
position in the rail yard, away from customers.98 Harrington agreed to take the yard 
position because he was afraid that if he did not, he would lose his job altogether.99 
Harrington said the MTA’s decision made him feel like “some sort of unique individual . 
. . who the public doesn’t want to see because I inspire fear in them as though I’m some 
sort of terrorist.”100 His experience demonstrates that segregation of Sikh employees is 
not a mere theoretical possibility—turbaned Sikhs are segregated in the employment 
context due to the actual or invented customer aversion to Sikhs’ religious identity.  
 As Harrington’s legal case against the MTA is pending resolution and thus does 
not supply us with judicial conclusions that may be reviewed and evaluated, I turn to two 
other cases in which the federal courts considered whether an employer could segregate 
                                                 
94 See Hon. Mary Murphy Schroeder, Guarding Against the Bigotry that Fuels Terrorism, 48-DEC Fed. 
Law. 26 (Nov./Dec. 2001) (commenting on the “blatant ignorance” of Sikhs that permitted a Sikh to be 
murdered in a post-9/11 hate incident); see generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Decade After 9/11, Ignorance 
Persists, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 16, 2011 (against the backdrop of an unprovoked attack on a man 
perceived to be Muslim, suggesting that Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim “are not free from the 
ignorance and hatred that enable such senseless acts to take place.”). 
95 See Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1130 n.1 (E.D.Cal. 
2003) . 
96 See Gohil & Sidhu, supra note [xxx] at 3 n.10. 
97 See Bilal Zaheer, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims Make the Case for a 
New Interpretation of Section 701(j), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 500 (2007). In March 2011, two turbaned 
Sikh men were shot in Elk Grove, California. The local police chief indicated that the men could have been 
confused for Muslims and thus targeted because of their appearance. See Robert Lewis, Attack on Two Sikh 
Men Seen as Possible Hate Crime, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 6, 2011, 
http://www.sacbee.com/2011/03/06/3453199/attack-on-two-sikh-men-seen-as.html. Attacks against Sikh 
individuals highlight how customers—and, therefore, employers—may discriminate against Sikhs in the 
workplace. 
98 See DAWINDER S. SIDHU, PLURALISM PROJECT, CASE STUDY 4: BRANDING A HERO (2010). 
99 See id. 
100 Robert Smith, Sikhs Object to MTA Logo Requirement, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (July 16, 2005), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4757415.  
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Sikh employees on the basis of their religious appearance. In both of these cases, the 
courts upheld the segregation of the Sikhs under Title VII.  
 
2. Birdi v. United Airlines Corporation 
 In Birdi v. United Airlines Corporation,101 the plaintiff, Sukhpreet S. Birdi, a 
turbaned Sikh, worked as a ticketing agent for United Airlines. United instituted a 
uniform policy that required employees to remove “all headgear . . . when indoors.”102 
Birdi’s turban violated this policy. In an effort to resolve the conflict, United offered to 
allow Birdi to wear his turban as long as he accepted one of six alternative positions. At 
least four of the six positions placed Birdi away from public view, and the remaining two 
were unfeasible because of Birdi’s schedule. The alternative positions were “radically 
different from the [customer service representative] job” that he held, and some paid 
significantly less. Believing that these options were inadequate to reasonably 
accommodate his religious beliefs, Birdi sued United Airlines under Title VII.103 
 In federal district court, Birdi presented his prima facie case. United then argued 
that it offered a reasonable accommodation because the six alternative positions would 
eliminate the conflict between its uniform policy and Birdi’s religious requirements.104 
Birdi argued in response that these positions were insufficient because none involved 
customer contact. He had been a ticketing agent, and he wanted to maintain a position 
that had some customer interaction. Indeed, he “sought the [customer service 
representative] position specifically for [the face-to-face customer contact] aspect and 
hope[d] to cultivate a career involving this type of customer relations.”105  
 The court rejected Birdi’s argument, stating that a plaintiff is not entitled to his 
preferred accommodation.106 Rather, the court held, United was obligated only to provide 
any reasonable accommodation that would remove the conflict between the uniform 
policy and the employee’s religiously-mandated appearance.107 At least five of the six 
alternative positions presented by United were satisfactory under this standard.108 
According to the court, “Title VII does not require United to accommodate Birdi’s need 
for face-to-face customer contact, and even if a conflict of schedule would render an 
accommodation unreasonable, United attempted to alleviate this problem by offering 
more positions.”109 
                                                 
101 No. 99 C 5576, 2002 WL 471999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002). 
102 Id. at *1. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. (“Title VII does not require the employer to provide the accommodation that the employee 
desires; any reasonable accommodation is sufficient.”) (citing EEOC v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., No. 95 C 
5610, 1997 WL 399635 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1997)). 
107 Id. at *2 (accepting at least five of the proposed accommodations as reasonable because they “offered 
the same benefits package and opportunity for advancement as was available to CSRs”). 
108 See id. (stating that “even if the ‘dead end’ position was unreasonable, at least one of the remaining five 
was reasonable”). 
109 Id. 
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 Birdi reflects the modest nature of the “reasonable accommodation” requirement 
under Title VII. More importantly for our purposes, the decision demonstrates courts’ 
willingness to find a proposed accommodation involving segregation acceptable under 
Title VII.  
 
3. EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc. 
 In EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc.,110 the plaintiff, Mohan Singh Tucker, had 
applied for a managerial position with Sambo’s Restaurants.111 Tucker, an observant 
Sikh, wore a turban and had a beard.112 Sambo’s, however, had a longstanding grooming 
policy that was applicable at all of its 1,100 restaurants. The policy required all 
employees to be clean-shaven (although “neatly trimmed mustaches” were allowed), 
prevented employees from wearing headgear, and did not include any exception for 
employees based on their religious beliefs.113 Sambo’s rejected Tucker’s employment 
application solely because he did not conform to the company’s grooming policy.114 The 
EEOC filed suit on Tucker’s behalf under Title VII.115  
 In its decision, the court noted that “the wearing of a beard . . . or headwear does 
not comply with the public image that Sambo’s has built up over the years.” It found that 
similar grooming policies “are common in the restaurant industry,” and that exceptions 
“would have an adverse effect on the Sambo’s system as a whole . . . [which is why] 
Sambo’s has never knowingly permitted any exceptions.” The court noted that Sambo’s’ 
facially neutral grooming policy is “based on management’s perception and experience 
that a significant segment of the consuming public (in the market aimed at and served by 
Sambo’s) prefer restaurants whose managers and employees are clean-shaven. According 
to the court, “adverse customer reaction in this market to beards arises from a simple 
aversion to, or discomfort in dealing with, bearded people; from a concern that beards are 
unsanitary or conducive to unsanitary conditions; or . . . from a concern that a restaurant 
operated by a bearded manager might be lax in maintaining its standards as to cleanliness 
and hygiene in other regards.” Therefore “the requirement of clean-shavenness . . . is 
essential to attracting and holding customers in that market.”116 
 As Sambo’s did not offer a reasonable accommodation to Tucker and dismissed 
his employment application outright, Sambo’s defended its actions under Title VII’s 
undue hardship safe harbor and the BFOQ affirmative defense.117 The court agreed with 
Sambo’s that an undue hardship precluded the statutory obligation to provide an 
accommodation: according to the court, any “relaxation” of Sambo’s grooming policy 
“would impose an undue hardship on Sambo’s in that doing so would adversely affect 
Sambo’s public image and the operation of the affected restaurant or restaurants as a 
                                                 
110 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
111 Id. at 88. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 88–89. 
114 Id. at 89.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 91. 
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consequence of offending certain customers and diminishing the ‘clean cut’ image of the 
restaurant and its personnel.” The court also held that exemptions from the grooming 
policy would impose “a risk of noncompliance with sanitation regulations,” and make it 
more difficult to enforce the grooming standards on other personnel.118 The court 
concluded that these costs are “certainly more” than the de minimis threshold needed for 
an undue hardship to exist.119 
 The EEOC argued that a defendant employer could not use customer preference 
to support a finding of an undue hardship. According to the EEOC, Sambo’s “attempt to 
justify [its] policy on the basis of customer preference . . . is an insufficient justification 
or defense as a matter of law.”120 The court was not convinced, holding that the 
“appearance of cleanliness in the retail food industry makes employee grooming 
standards that forbid facial hair a business necessity.”121  
The court did not rest there. Though the court relieved Sambo’s from the 
requirement of providing an accommodation on undue hardship grounds, it went on to 
rule in favor of Sambo’s on the BFOQ affirmative defense as well. According to the 
court, “clean-shavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification for a manager of a 
restaurant, such as those operated by Sambo’s, that relies upon and appeals to the family 
trade.”122 
 The Sambo’s court’s decision shows an acute awareness of and sensitivity to 
employers’ interests in placating customer preferences and maintaining their public 
image. It reflects the courts’ understanding that a failure to cater to customer preferences 
can have a detrimental effect on employers’ businesses.  
  
III. PROPERLY INTERPRETED, TITLE VII DOES NOT PERMIT WORKPLACE SEGREGATION ON 
THE BASIS OF RELIGION 
 In the remainder of this Article, I critically examine the arguments invoked by 
courts and commentators to justify the proposition that Title VII does not forbid 
workplace segregation of individuals with religiously-mandated appearances. I argue that 
the text and purpose of Title VII do not permit religion-based segregation as defined 
herein. This argument includes two subparts. First, an alternative position that places a 
religious employee outside of public view does not constitute a “reasonable 
accommodation” under Title VII. In other words, employers may not eliminate a conflict 
between an employees’ religious identity and the employers’ policies by segregating 
those employees whose appearance is dictated by their religious beliefs. Second, an 
employer may not use actual or perceived customer preferences as a basis for claiming it 
would face an “undue hardship” if it accommodated an individual with a religiously-
mandated appearance. Relatedly, an employer may not rely on its corporate brand, which 
                                                 
118 Id. at 90. 
119 Id. at 91. 
120 Id. at 91. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. The purported effect that the customer perception of facial hair may have on sanitation appeared to 
offer additional support for the court’s ruling in favor of Sambo’s. See id. at 89–90. That aspect of the 
court’s ruling is not challenged herein. See supra note [xxx]. 
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simply codifies and reflects customer preferences, to support an “undue hardship” 
claim.123  
 As the court’s interpretation of the law currently stands, employers’ statutory 
responsibilities under Title VII with respect to religious individuals are minimal. Though 
an employer has an affirmative obligation to provide a “reasonable accommodation,” the 
employer is required to do nothing more than provide an accommodation that eliminates 
the tension between the employer’s policies and the employee’s religious requirements. 
This is a very limited duty.124 Further, an employer need not bother to offer a reasonable 
accommodation where doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on an employer. The 
Third Circuit has described “the undue hardship test” as “not a difficult threshold to 
pass.”125 Under current precedent, therefore, employers who alter an individual’s work 
conditions due to his or her religiously-mandated appearance are protected from liability 
by fulfilling the undemanding “reasonable accommodation” requirement—which 
seemingly approves of segregation—or by invoking the easily-triggered “undue 
hardship” statutory sanctuary, which may be based on argument or evidence that 
consumers prefer receiving service from majoritarian employees. These standards have 
not been appropriately analyzed by the courts, and offer non-existent protection for 
individuals with religiously-mandated appearances. 
 
A. The Text and Purpose of Title VII Support a Ban on Workplace Segregation of 
Individuals with Conspicuous Articles of Faith 
 It is inappropriate for courts to read the “reasonable accommodation” language in 
Title VII in isolation. When an employee is discriminated against at work because of his 
or her religiously-mandated appearance, the court should evaluate the “reasonable 
accommodation” proposed by the employer in light of the the general anti-discrimination 
                                                 
123 For purposes of this Article, employer policies include employer-established brands or “corporate 
images,” which merely reflect and are codifications of what the customers find appealing. See Dianne 
Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 
14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 17 (2007) (“Using market surveys of consumer tastes and preferences, 
businesses look to customers for information about what attracts them to a particular product or service. 
Ultimately, businesses hope to develop a ‘brand’ that will draw and retain customers.”) See also id. at 18 
(“Customers who form an affective connection to a business’s products and services develop loyalty and 
commitment to—even passion for— the brand. Consumers who feel passion for the brand typically also 
embrace brand ownership as a means of self-expression: [C]onsumers choose brands in great part to tell the 
world and themselves who they are. . . . The consumer in effect believes, ‘The only way I can be who I am 
is to have specific products or services.’”) (select internal quotes omitted). 
124 See, e.g., Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental 
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 342 (2004) (“An employer’s obligation to 
reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious needs” has been “narrowly interpreted”); Huma T. 
Yunus, Employment Law: Congress Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: Title VII’s Prohibition of 
Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 657, 662–63 (2004) (“As a practical matter, 
almost any type of employer accommodation is sufficient to uphold the employer’s duty to reasonably 
accommodate under Title VII”). 
125 Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 260 (citing United States v. Bd. of Educ. for the Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 890 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
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provision of Title VII.126 This provision expressly makes it unlawful for an employer to 
“segregate . . . his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . religion.”127  
 This provision clarifies and restricts what may constitute a “reasonable 
accommodation” or “undue hardship.” The universe of what may be judicially recognized 
as a “reasonable accommodation” or “undue hardship” shrinks when this provision is 
added to the Title VII analysis. Accordingly, when an employer removes an employee to 
a position outside of public view because of his or her religious appearance, the employer 
is violating Title VII’s prohibition against segregation if the alternative position limits an 
employee’s opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the employee’s status.  
To place an religious individual outside of public view is to define the social 
space that he or she may occupy. Segregated positions isolate a person, they limit that 
person’s ability to interact with co-workers, customers, and the public at large, and they 
validate public or employer bias as to who is worthy to represent a company. Such 
positions deny cognizable opportunities and thus violate Title VII’s general anti-
discrimination provision. In other words, positions outside of public view are de facto 
unacceptable accommodations under the law.128  
 For similar reasons, an employer who refuses to hire an individual on the basis of 
his or her religious appearance is engaging in a form of segregation within the meaning 
of Title VII. Compared to the situation just described—in which an individual is 
employed, but hidden and confined to the back—an individual who is blocked from 
employment because of his or her religious appearance arguably has a stronger claim of 
segregation under Title VII. Indeed, a candidate who is denied a position remains outside 
of the workforce and is further isolated and marginalized from the social spaces that are 
inherent in employment. At least an employee who is relegated to the back areas is part 
of the employer; he or she is in the office or workplace, albeit in the shadows. An 
individual whose application is rejected, however, is completely severed from the 
employer, potential co-workers, and the public. 
 The practical consequences of segregation are important to consider. Unless the 
supplemental statutory limitation found in the general anti-discrimination provision is 
given effect, companies are allowed to place the Muslim with a hijab, the turbaned Sikh, 
and the Rastafarian with long-hair out of public sight, while those with majoritarian 
appearances represent the employer with customers in the front of the business. These 
appearance policies discriminate directly against the workers or job applicants and 
perpetuate the very stereotypes and fear that underlie the segregation of individuals with 
religiously-mandated appearances. If bearded Sikhs are never allowed to interact with 
customers, then customers will never overcome their “aversion to, or discomfort in 
dealing with, bearded people.”129 Courts should not read Title VII in a manner that  
                                                 
126 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2(a)(2) (2006). 
127 Id. 
128 The only exception to this principle is where the accommodation is the result of a bilateral process and 
the employee wants to move to a position in the back. 
129 EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
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strengthens discriminatory animus, nor should courts, as an institutional matter, enable 
this insidious spiral of discrimination to continue.  
 Although the legislative history of the Title VII provision that covers religious 
discrimination is quite limited,130 there is reason to believe Congress did not intend to 
allow employers to segregate minority employees. Senator Jennings Randolph, a major 
proponent of the religious accommodation provision, expressed “deep concern over 
employees being forced to choose between religion and their jobs.” He instead “hoped to 
eliminate that difficult choice for employees by requiring employers to make reasonable 
accommodations for the religious needs of employees.”131  
 As currently interpreted, however, Title VII does virtually nothing to eliminate 
this choice. An individual must either alter his or her appearance in violation of his or her 
religious beliefs or accept a position that restricts his or her employment opportunities, 
prevents him or her from interacting with customers, and effectively relegates him or her 
to second-tier status both in the specific sphere of employment and in the public more 
generally. There is no valid, fair choice in this scenario. The options are, at bottom, “to 
choose between a job and a deeply held religious practice.”132 Interpreting the 
“reasonable accommodation” standard in light of Title VII’s general anti-discrimination 
provision will advance the purpose of Title VII by forcing employers to provide religious 
employees with an accommodation that prevents this unfair choice   
 The findings of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)133 
offer additional support for reinterpreting the statute to reject a “reasonable 
accommodation” that involves segregation. The EEOC reacted to the rising number of 
cases of post-9/11 employment discrimination against Sikh employees by releasing 
informal guidance on how to interpret Title VII in light of the special issues raised by 
appearance-based religious discrimination. The guidance indicated that giving effect to 
public discomfort of religious minorities by segregating employees is impermissible 
under Title VII. The guidance contained the following example: 
“Susan is an experienced clerical worker who wears a hijab (head scarf) in 
conformance with her Muslim beliefs. XYZ Temps places Susan in a 
long-term assignment with one of its clients. The client contacts XYZ and 
requests that it notify Susan that she must remove her hijab while working 
at the front desk, or that XYZ assign another person to Susan’s position. 
According to the client, Susan’s religious attire violates its dress code and 
presents the “wrong image.” Should XYZ comply with its client’s 
request? 
                                                 
130 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (“The brief legislative history of s 701(j) is. 
. . of little assistance.”). 
131 Zaheer, supra note X, at 518 (discussing Senator Jennings Randolph’s statement during debates over 
Title VII’s reasonable accommodation provision). 
132 Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (D. Mass. 2006). 
133 The EEOC is the federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. 
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“XYZ Temps may not comply with this client request without violating 
Title VII. The client would also violate Title VII if it made Susan remove 
her hijab or changed her duties to keep her out of public view.”134 
 
This opinion is consistent with the argument contained in this article. The guidance 
possesses rather limited legal effect—according to the Supreme Court, such agency 
materials are “[e]ntitled to respect,” only if they have the “power to persuade.”135 The 
EEOC’s interpretation nonetheless buttresses the argument that such employer conduct 
violates Title VII. 
 Within this context, if we reconsider the Birdi case, it is clear that the plaintiff’s 
litigation strategy was a losing one. Birdi contended that no accommodation offered by 
United would be reasonable unless it involved customer contact.136 Framed in this light, 
the court ruled that a plaintiff in a religious accommodation case has no statutory right to 
the accommodation that she wants; the plaintiff’s right, the court held, is tied to only that 
which will eliminate the employer-employee conflict.137  
 Under a proper reading of Title VII, however, Birdi could argue that the 
alternatives offered by United would have effectively segregated him from the public and 
placed him out of sight solely because of his religious appearance. In other words, he 
would argue that no accommodation is reasonable if it involves segregation that 
“deprive[s] . . . [him] of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect[s] his 
status as an employee.”138 Birdi’s status was adversely affected. Unlike employees 
without conspicuous religious attire, he could not work in public areas or interact with 
other co-workers and customers. Framed in this way, a court properly interpreting Title 
VII would hold the options presented by United inadequate, not because they are 
inconsistent with Birdi’s preferences, but because of the segregation that would have 
resulted.  
 
B. Customer Preference May Not Legitimate Otherwise D iscriminatory Employment 
Actions  
 When examining whether to uphold an employer’s appearance policy in light of 
an employee’s incompatible religious appearance, courts, including the Sambo’s court, 
                                                 
134 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT EMPLOYER 
RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF MUSLIMS, ARABS, SOUTH ASIANS, AND SIKHS 2 
(2005), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/backlash-employer.html. 
135 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944) (“the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance .”). 
136 Birdi v. UAL Corp., No. 99 C 5576, 2002 WL 471999, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002). 
137 Id. 
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006) (deeming employment practices that “segregate” employees in any 
way that “would deprive . . . any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee” unlawful). 
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have placed significant weight on evidence of customer reaction to the policy.139 For 
instance, in Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., the D.C. Circuit noted: “Perhaps no facet 
of business life is more important than a company’s place in public estimation. That the 
image created by its employees dealing with the public . . .  affects its relations is so well 
known that we may take judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve 
favorable acceptance.”140  
 It is no surprise that courts have upheld employer appearance standards under 
Title VII given their recognition of the relationship between employee appearance, 
customer reaction, and a company’s success. The Fagan court found that an employer’s 
grooming policies operate “in our highly competitive business environment” and that 
“[r]easonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are [therefore] an aspect of 
managerial responsibility.”141 Accordingly, as the First Circuit cautioned, if an employer 
were to make an exemption for a religious employee, the employer would “forfeit[] its 
ability to mandate compliance and thus [it] loses control over its public image. That loss . 
. . would constitute an undue hardship.”142 
 These courts have assumed that there is a sufficient nexus between  employers’ 
appearance policies generally and the preferences of their customer base. Other courts, 
however, have required a defendant employer to show that its specific appearance policy 
garners a positive reception from the public or that granting an exception to that policy 
will lead to a loss of business.143 For example, in EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, 
Inc., the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington rejected a 
restaurant’s motion for summary judgment in a Title VII claim brought by an employee 
with tattoos acquired for religious reasons.144 According to the court, while the employer 
may have wanted to maintain a “family-oriented and kid-friendly image,” the employer 
“fail[ed] to present any evidence that visible tattoos are inconsistent with these goals 
generally, or that its customers specifically share this perception. Hypothetical hardships 
based on unproven assumptions typically fail to constitute undue hardship.”145  
 I argue that it is irrelevant to the “undue hardship” analysis that an employer can 
prove its customers prefer employees who abide by the employers’ appearance policies. 
To the extent that employers have evidence that the public likes and expects employees to 
conform to a particular “look,” the public’s preferences may, at worst, be infected with 
                                                 
139 EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89–90 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
140 Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Although Fagan was a sex 
discrimination case, the court’s explanation of the importance of public image is relevant to religious 
appearance cases. 
141 Id. at 1125. 
142 Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 137 (1st Cir. 2004). 
143 See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that “undue hardship must be 
determined within the particular factual context of each case”); Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 
F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (The court is “somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships that an employer 
thinks might be caused by an accommodation that never has been put into practice”). 
144 No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005). The plaintiff practiced 
Kemetecism, “a religion with roots in Egypt.” Id. He obtained his tattoos, which “represent his servitude to 
Ra, the Egyption god of sun, and his commitment to his faith,” at a religious ceremony. Id. 
145 Id. at *5.. 
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animus and, at best, perpetuate and reinforce homogenous conceptions as to who should 
serve and interact with the public. Unfortunately, “people . . . are most comfortable 
interacting with those who are visibly similar to themselves.”146 It is axiomatic that 
people tend to have more contact with individuals who have shared characteristics, such 
as race and religion;147 that people tend to “hold high opinions of groups to which they 
belong and low opinions of those to which they do not;”148 and that people tend to trust 
“those who are most like . . . [us] physically and culturally,” rather than those who “look 
different and follow different practices.”149 In fact, sociological evidence indicates that 
the preference to be around and to interact with those who look similar leads individuals 
to segregate themselves according to shared physical attributes, and necessarily exclude 
individuals not possessing certain traits.150  This evidence supports the notion that 
employers  are “motivated to pursue homogeneity,” not just externally with the public, 
but also internally based on the perception that “homogeneous workplaces facilitate trust, 
loyalty, and cooperative behavior.”151  
Although most courts have ignored the reality of what customer preferences 
actually reflect, at least one court has recognized that a lenient interpretation of Title VII 
only perpetuates discriminatory views. The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts in Brown, bound by precedent, approved an employer’s appearance 
policy, but noted in dicta that “an excessive protection of an employer’s ‘image’ 
predilection encourages an unfortunately (and unrealistically) homogeneous view of our 
richly varied nation.”152  
 Yet again, the EEOC  offers support for reinterpreting the statute to ignore 
customer preferences in the “undue hardship” analysis. In two separate documents—the 
EEOC Title VII guidance and the EEOC current compliance manual on religious 
discrimination—the EEOC sets forth examples of employer behavior that violates Title 
VII for taking customer preference into account in the specific context of employees or 
applicants with conspicuous religious attire. The Title VII guidance presents the 
following example: 
                                                 
146 Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 
86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 431–32 (2008) Green also explains that, “conceptions of professionalism tend to 
overlap with white, male norms and severely restrict the extent to which individuals can signal membership 
in racial and gender identity categories.” Id. at 433. It is no different with members of religious minorities. 
147 See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 670 (2007) (quoting GRAHAM A. 
ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPING A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 23 (1989)) (stating that friends tend “to 
have similar ethnic backgrounds and, where it is of social consequence, to belong to the same religion.”) 
148 Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1531 (2005) (quoting James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. 
Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF 
REASON 153, 164 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000)). 
149 Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted). 
150 See Seth P. Mackinnon, et al., Birds of a Feather Sit Together: Physical Similarity Predicts Seating 
Choice, 37 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 879 (2011). 
151 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 
1757, 1801–02 (2003). 
152 Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (D. Mass. 2006). See also id. (“Worse, it places 
persons whose work habits and commitment to their employers may be exemplary in the position of having 
to choose between a job and a deeply held religious practice.”). 
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Narinder, a South Asian man who wears a Sikh turban, applies for a 
position as a cashier at XYZ Discount Goods. XYZ fears Narinder’s 
religious attire will make customers uncomfortable.  
What should XYZ do? 
XYZ should not deny Narinder the job due to notions of customer 
preferences about religious attire. That would be unlawful. It would be the 
same as refusing to hire Narinder because he is a Sikh.153 
The EEOC’s current compliance manual on religious discrimination provides a similarly 
powerful example:  
Nasreen, a Muslim ticket agent for a commercial airline, wears a head 
scarf, or hijab, to work at the airport ticket counter. After September 11, 
2001, her manager objected, telling Nasreen that the customers might 
think she was sympathetic to terrorist hijackers. Nasreen explains to her 
manager that wearing the hijab is her religious practice and continues to 
wear it. She is terminated for wearing it over her manager’s objection. 
Customer fears or prejudices do not amount to undue hardship, and the 
refusal to accommodate her and the termination, therefore, violate Title 
VII. In addition, denying Nasreen the position due to perceptions of 
customer preferences about religious attire would be disparate treatment 
based on religion in violation of Title VII, because it would be the same as 
refusing to hire Nasreen because she is a Muslim.154 
 
 The EEOC explicitly states that “notions about customer preference real or 
perceived do not establish undue hardship.”155 By allowing employers to follow customer 
preference, “white, male norms” are approved for public presentation and 
consumption.156 Unfamiliar religious appearances, particularly those belonging to 
minority faiths, are marginalized, either because the employer is uncomfortable with 
appearances outside the mainstream or because the employer believes it is respecting the 
public’s wishes.157 As a consequence, minority employees with visible representations of 
their faiths are compelled to either hide their differences in order to conform to 
                                                 
153 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 104.25, at 1.   
154 EEOC, Compliance Manual § 47 (religious garb) (citing to a resolution order in EEOC v. American 
Airlines, Civil Action No. 02-C-6172 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2002)).  
155 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 104.25, at 2. 
156 Green, supra note 114, at 433. 
157See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community 
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2558 (1994) (“The problem [with the judicial 
treatment of workplace appearance issues] is that they rely on unexamined, culture-bound judgments that 
will tend to reinforce existing, hidden prejudices and stereotypes. Such judgments reflect more about the 
high degree of societal consensus regarding dress and appearance expectations than about the value that 
individuals or businesses attach to dress and appearance.”). 
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majoritarian, accepted appearances,158 or maintain their distinct appearance at the risk of 
losing employment opportunities.159 
 When an employer endorses or validates the public’s discriminatory attitudes, 
whether hidden or overt, it gives effect to those attitudes—whether or not the employer 
held those same views. As Judge Richard Posner writes: 
“A person who serves as a conduit for another person’s discrimination can 
. . . be guilty of intentional discrimination . . . . Suppose a merchant 
refuses to hire black workers not because he is racist but because he 
believes that his customers do not like blacks and will take their business 
elsewhere if he hires any. The refusal is nevertheless discrimination, 
because it is treating people differently on account of their race. It is 
intentional discrimination, because it necessarily is based on the 
merchant’s awareness of racial difference and his decision to base 
employment decisions on that awareness. And it is actionable 
discrimination . . . notwithstanding the merchant’s own freedom from 
racial animus.”160  
 
There is no reason to ignore Judge Posner’s words even though they were made in the 
context of racial discrimination as opposed to religious appearance discrimination. Under 
this “conduit” theory, an employer may not insulate itself from claims of discrimination 
under Title VII by invoking the discriminatory views of its customer base, even when 
there is evidence of customer preferences.161  
 Where employees with conspicuous religious appearances are confined to certain 
spaces, they lose the chance to interact with other colleagues and customers; they are 
forced to perform different tasks in a position outside of view, and in the most extreme 
                                                 
158 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 837 (2002) (“[C]overing requires . . . that the 
individual modulate her conduct to make her difference easy for those around her to disattend her known 
stigmatized trait.”). See generally Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace 
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translates into the ‘White Man’s Wardrobe.’” See Bandsuch, at 330. 
159 See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (D. Mass. 2006) (excessive deference to 
employer image concerns “places persons whose work habits and commitment to their employers may be 
exemplary in the position of having to choose between a job and a deeply held religious practice”). 
160 Vill, of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530–31 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Platner v. Cash & 
Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) (“An employer may not illegally 
discriminate simply because some third party urges or pressures him to do so.”). While Judge Posner 
addressed the “conduit” theory in the context of race, in the next section, Part III.C., infra, it will be argued 
that race (and other protected traits) should be treated equally under Title VII.  
161 See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding impermissible, in a 
race discrimination suit, an employer’s “no beards” policy despite the fact that customer surveys showed 
preference for clean-shaven employees). 
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cases, they are eliminated from the candidate pool entirely. These deficiencies render an 
accommodation that involves segregation inherently impermissible under Title VII no 
matter how persuasively an employer may claim its customers prefer individuals not 
bearing a conspicuous religious appearance.  It is time to square this social and physical 
isolation, and its attendant stigmatization,162 with Title VII’s command to ensure that the 
religious rights of the individual are sufficiently protected.163   
 
C. Other Contexts Support a Prohibition Against Segregation Premised on Religious 
Appearance  
 Unfortunately, it is not a new phenomenon for employers to segregate or refuse to 
hire optically different individuals whom they believe will put off their customers. Many 
employers had tried to exclude African-Americans and women from jobs at their 
workplaces, but the courts stepped in to prohibit workplace segregation on the basis of 
race and gender. The courts’ rejection of this employer behavior in other civil rights 
contexts is instructive and supports the doctrinal position that Title VII does not permit 
employers to hide—inside the workplace or from the workforce—religious employees 
with conspicuous articles of faith.  
 Congress responded to widespread racial discrimination in employment by 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964.164 The courts interpreted this legislation broadly to 
prevent discrimination based on consumer preference. As Professor Deborah Rhode 
notes, “Southern employers often argued that hiring blacks would be financially ruinous; 
white customers would go elsewhere. In rejecting such customer preference defenses, 
Congress and the courts recognized that the most effective way of combating prejudice 
was to deprive people of the option to indulge it.”165 The Court explained in 1964, that 
“the fact that a ‘member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses not 
shared by others . . . has never been a barrier’ to [upholding the Civil Rights Act].’”166  
These principles from the civil rights era on the use of customer preferences and 
the risk of financial loss parallel and apply to the religious context as well. It is difficult 
                                                 
162 Harrington’s comments speak to the dehumanization that such employer action provokes. See Robert 
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to square the Court’s view on the role of customer preference based on race with the role 
of customer preference based on religious appearance.167  
 Courts have rejected similar employer arguments when used to justify requiring 
female employees to look or act a certain way because of customer expectations related 
to gender.168 In Diaz v. Pan Am, the Fifth Circuit, for example, refused to find a BFOQ 
simply because “Pan Am’s passengers prefer female stewardesses.” According to the 
court, “it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices 
of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to 
a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.”169 
 In perhaps the most comparable instance of customer preference influencing 
allegedly discriminatory employer behavior, a group of women, Latinos, Asian-
Americans, and African-Americans brought a class action suit challenging the 
employment practices of Abercrombie & Fitch.170 The plaintiffs, applicants to and 
employees of the popular American clothier, charged that they were either not hired or 
“were steered not to sales positions out front, but to low-visibility, back-of-the-store jobs, 
stocking and cleaning up”171 because they did not conform to Abercrombie’s corporate 
image, specifically a “classic American,” or White look.172 The parties settled, with 
Abercrombie agreeing to pay the plaintiffs approximately $40 million and to engage in 
more diverse employment activities, among other things.173  
 It is incongruous to recognize the impermissibility of converting customer 
predispositions into a valid basis for employer decisionmaking when it is “because of” 
race, gender, and ethnicity, but not when it is “because of” religion or religious 
                                                 
167 See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (“It is similarly not 
irrational, but it is clearly forbidden by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to hire someone because your 
customers or clientele do not like his race.”); EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hosp. of Chi., 664 F.2d 128, 133 (7th 
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168 See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding unpersuasive 
employer’s justification for female-only appearance standards to compete and cater to client preferences 
and expectations).  
169 See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (1971). 
170 Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & Fitch Bias Case Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A16.  
171 Id.  
172 See Elizabeth Kelly, Claims Against Abercrombie Detailed, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at C2. 
173 See Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Nos. 03-2817 SI, 04-4730 and 04-4731 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 14, 2005) 
(consent decree). Abercrombie was also sued in the United Kingdom by a disabled employee who alleged 
that, because of her prosthetic arm, she was relegated to the stockroom for failing to meet the company’s 
“look policy.” Woman Wins Clothes Store Tribunal, BBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8200140.stm. The plaintiff prevailed in a U.K. employment tribunal, which 
found that the plaintiff was mistreated because she breached this “look policy.” Id.  
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appearance—even though all four categories are protected by Title VII. Reading Title VII 
to prohibit such employer action, when it implicates distinct appearance caused by race, 
gender, ethnicity, or religion, would give full effect to Title VII’s broad mandate and 
resolve an imbalance which, at present, renders Title VII a limited safeguard for 
employees with conspicuous religious appearances when compared to other protected 
groups.  
 To be sure, one may argue that religion is unlike these other contexts for two 
distinct reasons. First, racial and gender-specific appearances are said to be immutable, 
whereas an individual’s religious appearance is technically alterable. To this, I point to 
Sikhism as an example of why this potential objection is unpersuasive.  A Sikh’s turban 
and unshorn hair are not an option, but rather an integral, mandatory part of Sikh identity.  
Indeed, a major Sikh civil rights organization explains that, “When a Sikh man or woman 
dons a turban, the turban ceases to be just a piece of cloth and becomes one and the same 
with the Sikh's head.”174  In other words, for a Sikh, the turban and his or her physical 
body become inseparable.  In this respect, overt religious identity is an inextricable part 
of the self, and is akin to race or gender.  
Second, one may contend that customer preference for a particular racial or 
gender-specific appearance directly reflects customers’ discriminatory animus against a 
particular race or gender. But, one may continue, customer preferences in the religion 
context are qualitatively different in that they may be neutral. Customers may find a 
person with a clean-cut look more appealing—for example, because he looks cleaner—
regardless of whether that person maintains a beard for religious or non-religious reasons. 
To this, I respond that Title VII does not require a customer to know that the beard has 
religious significance – as long as the employer makes a decision based on an actual or 
perceived preference that is part of an employee or applicant’s religious practices, the 
employer is making a decision “because of” religion and thus falls within the bounds of 
Title VII.  As the two EEOC documents noted above place beyond dispute, such a 
decision is the functional equivalent of rejecting an accommodation to an employee or 
denying a position to an applicant because of religion, Judge Posner’s “conduit” theory 
supports this argument, Specifically, in adopting or validating the preferences of its 
customers, the employer becomes responsible for those preferences. Moreover, in a prima 
facie case, the plaintiff need only prove that he or she informed the employer of the 
conflict between her religious beliefs and the employment policy as well as explain the 
religious need for the accommodation.  At that point, the employer is on notice of the 
religious nature of the employee or applicant’s appearance and becomes responsible for 
the underlying preferences of the public, even if the public is itself unaware of the 
religious character of a beard, headdress, or similar element of visual identity. 
 
D. Sufficient Solutions Are Needed to Ensure Title VII is Read to Ban Religion-Based 
Workplace Segregation 
 Employers will only be prohibited from discriminating against employees with 
conspicuous religious appearances if courts engage in a more integrated reading of the 
                                                 
174 Why Sikhs Wear a Turban, Sikh Coalition, available at http://www.sikhcoalition.org/Sikhism11.asp. 
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text and purpose of Title VII, consider the harms of giving effect to discriminatory 
customer preferences, and remember the lessons learned from other contexts. Rather than 
wait for the courts, Congress should take action to clarify Title VII and restore its full 
meaning as it relates to discrimination based on religion.  
 The Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) offers an opportunity for Congress 
to strengthen Title VII in principled ways.175 According to the Act, its purpose is “to 
address the history and widespread pattern of discrimination by private sector employers 
and Federal, State, and local government employers in unreasonably denying religious 
accommodations in employment, specifically in the areas of garb, grooming, and 
scheduling.”176 Senator Kerry, the sponsor of the bill, rose to declare that Congress 
should change Title VII to clarify that it does not tolerate an employee being forced to 
make the choice between the employee’s religion and his or her job. Senator Kerry said: 
“In a Nation founded on freedom of religion, no American should ever have to choose 
between keeping a job and keeping faith with their cherished religious beliefs and 
traditions.” According to Senator Kerry, the bill “protects the wearing of yarmulkes, 
hijabs, turbans and Mormon garments—all the distinctive marks of religious practices, all 
the things that people of faith should never be forced to hide.” 177 In relevant part, the 
proposed WRFA declares that, under Title VII, it “shall not be considered to be a 
reasonable accommodation if the accommodation requires segregation of an employee 
from customers or the general public.”178  
 The benefit of pursuing a legislative approach is that it requires no judicial 
reinterpretation. The body that passed Title VII would clarify to the courts that placing 
employees with distinct religious identities in the back in order to resolve the conflict 
between the employer’s policies and the employee’s religion is impermissible under Title 
VII. If passed, WRFA would leave little question that the employer’s proposed 
accommodations in Birdi were insufficient under Title VII. 
  Yet WRFA, even if passed, would not fully address the problems with the courts’ 
current interpretation of Title VII, as described herein. Specifically, WRFA does not 
prohibit employers from considering customer preference under the statute’s “undue 
hardship” analysis for religious discrimination claims. It would, in other words, fail to 
stand in the way of a court ruling the same way as the Sambo’s court.179  While the 
proposed Act would require the “undue hardship” safe harbor under Title VII to be read 
consistently with the stricter “undue hardship” definition found in the ADA, it is not 
certain that this more heightened standard would prohibit employers from invoking 
customer preferences as a means to avoid Title VII liability.180 Accordingly, to more 
                                                 
175 Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 4046, 111th Cong. § 4(a)(2)(C) (2010). 
176 Id. § 3(1) 
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178 S. 4046 § 4(a)(3)(2)(C). 
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employer’s business only if the accommodation imposes a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct 
of the employer’s business when considered in light of relevant factors set forth in section 101(10)(B) of 
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fully protect individuals with conspicuous articles of faith, Congress should amend the 
bill to state that the actual or perceived loss of business or decline in corporate image 
stemming from negative customer reactions to individuals with conspicuous religious 
appearances cannot form the basis, in part or in whole, for a finding of an “undue 
hardship” under Title VII – even if the meaning of “undue hardship” is derived from the 
ADA. The present WRFA is not ideal, it nonetheless promises to bolster Title VII 
precisely where courts have struggled to properly fulfill its purpose.  
A final note in this section is appropriate before turning to other matters. While 
WRFA theoretically would represent an important, though partial, improvement of Title 
VII, I acknowledge that Congress has considered—and failed to pass—previous versions 
of WRFA for over a decade.181 One civil rights advocate who read a draft of this article 
expressed his view in private that Senator Kerry’s introduction of WRFA is more a 
symbolic message of the Senator’s personal convictions regarding religious 
discrimination in employment rather than a genuine attempt to put forth legislation that 
has a chance of amending Title VII.182 Therefore, my purpose here is not tied specifically 
to WRFA or any particular legislation. It is directed at shifting ideas and attitudes with 
respect to the religious discrimination so that, whatever efforts are made in this area, they 
possess a plausible doctrinal foundation in addition to the necessary will to be accepted. 
 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL IMPLICATIONS OF BANNING WORKPLACE 
SEGREGATION 
A. The Constitution and Workplace Segregation 
 Religious discrimination in employment relates not only to the statutory 
commands of Title VII, but also to the constitutional protections of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.183 In particular, plaintiffs with religiously-mandated 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” Id. § 4(a)(3)(2)(B). The factors under the Americans with 
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on employment discrimination on the basis of religion). 
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this Article to assess the constitutionality of employer policies as they may abridge the rights of individuals 
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appearances may also seek religious exemptions to neutral, generally applicable 
government laws or policies under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs pursuing 
constitutional challenges to government laws or policies in the employment context face 
an evolving patchwork of standards on the federal and state levels. As a historical matter, 
the Free Exercise Clause was read to require an exemption to generally applicable 
government policies only if the statute or policy expressly provided for one.184 In 1963, 
however, the Supreme Court issued Sherbert v. Verner, a landmark Free Exercise ruling 
in which the Court held that a sincere religious objector185 is entitled to an exemption 
from a generally applicable law that imposes a substantial burden on the individual’s 
exercise of his or her religion, unless the law in question survives strict scrutiny.186 A 
substantial burden is generally defined as either compelling an individual to do that 
which violates her religious beliefs or prohibiting an individual from that which is 
mandated by his or her religious beliefs.187 
 In 1990, the Court in Employment Division v. Smith reversed course, eliminating 
the presumptive constitutional model and reverting back to the default rule in which an 
exemption to generally applicable, facially neutral laws or policies for religious reasons 
was required only when the statute itself carved out an exemption.188 In 1993, in response 
to this ruling, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),189 
which adopted the 1963 Court’s standard and sought to restore the presumptive 
exemption model190. In 1997, the Court concluded that RFRA is unconstitutional as 
applied to the states, leaving it effective only with respect to the federal government and 
the territories.191  
 The Court in the seminal Employment Division case was concerned about the 
ramifications of ceding to religious exemptions to generally applicable laws in such a 
                                                                                                                                                 
with conspicuous religious appearances. However, it is important to consider the Supreme Court’s analysis 
to compare it to the Title VII context. 
184 See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1473 
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sincere. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Em. Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“it is not within 
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186 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).  
187 Id. at 404.  
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189 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. 
190 Id. at § 2000bb(b)(1). 
191 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 n.2 (2005) 
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territories and possessions.”).  
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diverse society.192 If strict scrutiny is to be applied to one group seeking a religious 
exemption, the Court noted, “then it must be applied across the board, to all actions 
thought to be religiously commanded.”193 Given the searching review demanded by strict 
scrutiny and the potential for it to be invoked by many groups, “many laws will not meet 
the test.”194 Importantly, the Court added, “[a]ny society adopting such a system would 
be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's 
diversity of religious beliefs.”195 Our society is “a cosmopolitan nation made up of 
people of almost every conceivable religious preference.”196 To endorse strict scrutiny in 
this context, the Court concluded “would open the prospect of constitutionally required 
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”197 In 
other words, it would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law 
of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”198 
 In light of Smith, it is necessary to respond to the Court’s explicit concerns about 
the slippery slope of granting religious exemptions in such a diverse society, even though 
Smith does not apply to claims pursuant to Title VII. Just as governments will be unable 
to effectively implement necessary laws if they are expected to accommodate every 
religious individual in need of an exemption, employers will argue that they cannot 
accommodate any and all employees or applicants who possess some religious belief that 
is expressed through appearance. They may say that the cost of exempting countless 
religious employees from general employment policies will amount to anarchy or the 
inability to effectively manage the workplace.  
 At least three responses are appropriate here. First, the belief in Smith that 
adopting the compelling interest standard and thus expanding the right of individuals to a 
reasonable accommodation will court anarchy is pure speculation.  Smith involved a 
claim for a religious exemption to laws banning the use of peyote.199  As one scholar 
pointed out, the Court’s concern about the floodgates opening “only makes sense if lots 
of religious groups use outlawed drugs, which they do not.”200 Smith’s parade of 
horribles is not grounded in fact or in any reasonable forecast as to an expanded request 
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to use ceremonial drugs.  More broadly, there is no evidence that this heightened 
standard, which was the operative standard following Sherbert, led to any identifiable 
“anarchy” in religious accommodations outside of the peyote context.201   
Separately, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in a case involving 
whether a religious accommodation should be granted to an individual who refused to 
work on Sundays for religious reasons.202  The Court entertained the defendants’ 
contention that the accommodation would result in the collapse of general activities held 
on or reserved for Sundays: “What would Sunday be today if professional football, 
baseball, basketball, and tennis were barred. Today Sunday is not only a day for religion, 
but for recreation and labor. Today the supermarkets are open, service stations dispense 
fuel, utilities continue to serve the people and factories continue to belch smoke and 
tangible products[.]”203 The defendants’ posited that “[i]f all Americans were to abstain 
from working on Sunday, chaos would result.”204  The Court stated it was 
“unpersuaded… that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employ” if the 
plaintiff were granted the accommodation, as there was “nothing before us in this case to 
suggest that Sunday shopping, or Sunday sporting, for that matter, will grind to a halt as a 
result of our decision[.]”205   And so it is here.  The Court in Smith did not substantiate its 
chaos rationale with any proof that the compelling interest standard and a purported 
increase in accommodations would reduce civil society to the whims of religious 
individuals or dissolve general order to a situation in which man becomes a law unto 
himself.  Accordingly, Smith itself should not stand in the way of individuals’ entitlement 
to religious accommodations in the employment sector.   
 Second, the “anarchy” concern in Smith may stem from the Court’s discomfort 
with the possibility that unfamiliar and unknown religious groups will come out of the 
woodwork and attain exemptions from generally applicable laws.  Put more directly by 
Professor McConnell in response to Smith’s “courting anarchy” concern, “the Court’s 
decision upheld majoritarian values and preserved the ability of the government to ensure 
that governmental policy is enforced without the irritant of minority religious 
interests.”206  The Court, Professor McConnell continued, was not “responsive to 
minority interests” and instead was more “solicitous of majoritarian values.”207   
I share Professor McConnell’s view that the level of possible comfort with an 
individual’s religious appearance, or with the religion itself, should not determine who is 
protected by Title VII. In other words, an employee with relatively familiar religious 
practices should not be entitled to civil rights safeguards while those with relatively 
foreign or exotic religious practices are left outside of the universe of groups that may 
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have recourse under Title VII. The “courting anarchy” position thus fails additionally 
because it promotes majoritarian religious expression at the cost of the less familiar, 
though religious nonetheless. 
 An opposite view would make a religious community’s civil rights protection 
contingent or dependent on the degree to which the people are aware or comfortable with 
that community. Title VII cannot be translated into a scoreboard of social discomfort. 
The solution is not to validate Smith’s unfounded fears about indefinite exemptions to 
neutral laws by categorically excluding some very unfamiliar minority religious groups 
from the ambit of Title VII protection. Instead, it is to have confidence in the statutory 
burden-shifting regime to weed out those claims that are not entitled to an 
accommodation and to identify through this filtering process those plaintiffs who the 
courts must protect. 
Third, there is a greater problem with the religious diversity concerns raised in 
Smith, and this problem relates to framing. If discrimination statutes are construed as 
embodying distinctions, the Court understandably may be troubled and overwhelmed by 
the countless number of distinctions that may follow and that may ostensibly chisel away 
at a more established, unified order. One may be less inclined to legitimize a grievance if 
it is seen as an outsider’s attempt to receive special recognition or protection. If, however, 
plaintiffs construe their claims as abridgments of universally held rights or principles, the 
courts and the public may view employers’ attempts to restrict religion-based 
appearances as breaching something shared and that impacts all concerned, namely our 
nation’s commitment to ensuring every person has the right and ability to practice the 
religion of her choosing.  Advocates and plaintiffs should reframe civil rights claims, 
including those made pursuant to Title VII, as claims protecting shared human rights so 
“that infringements of anyone’s rights necessarily may be seen to affect the rights of 
everyone else.”208 The Smith court’s concern may be based on accommodations through 
the lens of heterogeneity and the numerous groups that can invoke protective legislation, 
rather than the oneness of equality and religious freedom that lie at the heart of civil 
rights statutes, including Title VII.  
 
B. Judicial Review and Workplace Segregation 
 
 Courts also have reasoned that they should not be in the business of assessing an 
employer’s neutral, generally applicable business decisions.209 This argument suggests 
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that employers should have free reign to determine how to run their businesses as long as 
their decisions are not made to purposefully inhibit religious minorities. This line of 
thinking would likely include decisions based on an employer’s consideration of 
customer choice, as every business needs to cater to its client base. Although I have 
argued in Part II that customer preference should never justify employment actions that 
deny religious rights to an individual, further comment may be in order.  
 I do not quarrel with the proposition that business decisions should generally rest 
with the employer. Title VII, however, vests courts with the limited, though critical, 
responsibility to ensure that businesses, however they are run, do not discriminate 
illegally. As the Eighth Circuit noted, “employers are free to make their own business 
decisions, even inefficient ones, so long as they do not discriminate unlawfully.”210 That 
is, courts are to assess the legality, not the propriety, of employer behavior.  
 When Title VII was first enacted, some courts were hesitant to intervene in 
disputes over generally applicable policies related to appearance. 211 Title VII, they said, 
prohibits discrimination “because of” an individual’s religion; generally applicable 
policies are not motivated by or directed towards religion.212 The Supreme Court, 
however, has made clear on numerous occasions that Title VII applies to laws that are 
facially neutral and generally applicable. The Court, in its own words, “has repeatedly 
held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that 
are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a 
particular group.”213 Accordingly, employer policies governing appearance that impact 
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religious attire. In short, my argument relates to improving that process, not blanket or presumptive 
illegality of generally neutral policies.  
212 See E. Greyhound Lines Div. of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 265 N.E.2d 
745, 746–47 (N.Y. 1970) (ruling on state employment discrimination statute that emulates Title VII that 
employer was not required to accommodate bearded Muslim employee subject to appearance policy, as the 
policy applied generally and the employer employed numerous Muslims). Many courts came to similar 
conclusions in the race and sex discrimination contexts. See Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 523 F.2d 725, 
728 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Of course individual citizens have a constitutional right to wear beards, sideburns 
and mustaches in any form and to any length they may choose. But that is not a right protected by the 
Federal Government, by statute or otherwise, in a situation where a private employer has prescribed 
regulations governing the grooming of its employees while in that employer’s service. The wearing of a 
uniform, the type of uniform, the requirement of hirsute conformity applicable to whites and blacks alike, 
are simply non-discriminatory conditions of employment falling within the ambit of managerial decision to 
promote the best interests of its business.”); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896–97 (9th Cir. 
1974) (stating that Title VII is aimed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of classification, not 
“regulations by employers of dress or cosmetic or grooming practices which an employer might think his 
particular business required”). 
213 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) (citations omitted). 
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religious individuals fall within Title VII’s commands and are thus subject to judicial 
review notwithstanding the fact that the policies may be neutral or generally applicable. 
Therefore, courts presented with workplace segregation cases are to perform their routine 
judicial function by ensuring that employers do not discriminate on the basis of religion, 
even when the employer policies in question are non-discriminatory on their face.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This Article explores employers’ attempts to respond to actual or perceived 
preferences of customers by placing employees with conspicuous religious appearances 
in areas out of public view or by rejecting applicants with overt religious identities 
altogether.  This Article challenges these practices, and the court decisions that uphold 
them, as inconsistent with Title VII.   
There are two primary bases for this opposition. The first speaks to effects.  These 
practices reinforce majoritarian norms, marginalize individuals following their religious 
tenets, establish defined social spaces to which these individuals are restricted, and deny 
these individuals meaningful employment opportunities.  Put differently, these practices 
effectively inform individuals with conspicuous religious that they are categorically 
unsuitable for certain employment and the social interactions that public positions 
necessarily entail simply because of their appearance, whereas applicants without the 
religious appearance are accepted as presumptively fit to be among other co-workers and 
the public that the employer serves. Second, the law.  These practices cannot be squared 
with various legal sources, including the text and purpose of Title VII, federal case law, 
and lessons from related contexts, which all point to the view that the law does not permit 
employers to segregate individuals with obvious religious identities for customer- or 
image-based reasons either in the workplace or from the workforce.   Specifically, such 
segregation cannot constitute a “reasonable accommodation” under Title VII and 
negative customer reactions or the loss of possible business from accommodating the 
described employees or applicants cannot give rise to the statute’s “undue hardship” safe 
harbor.  
In addition, this Article argues in support of legislation that would make clear that 
the segregation of individuals with such identities, even if based on customer preferences, 
is outside of the bounds of Title VII.  Without either the clarification offered in this 
Article or legislation that reinforces the strictures of Title VII, courts may continue to 
enable employers to both segregate individuals who look differently on account of their 
religion and perpetuate stereotypical notions as to the proper physical and social areas to 
which the overtly religious belong.  
It may be the case that the conspicuously religious, either as a class or particular 
unfamiliar subparts, are not accepted by society as deserving certain positions or the 
ability to interact fully with the public at large.  Such social calculations, infected as they 
may be by biases and majoritarian preferences, will, when left alone, direct the roles and 
proper places of the religious or the minority.  The law, however, commands and compels 
otherwise unrestrained social behavior to conform to specific rules and principles.  In this 
instance and as this Article argues, the law requires that individuals with visible religious 
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identities shall be free to occupy certain positions and to mingle with the people -- 
notwithstanding the individuals’ religious appearances or any social aversion thereto. 
